Mythical numbers and the proceeds of organised crime: estimating mafia proceeds in Italy by Calderoni, Francesco (ORCID:0000-0003-2979-4599)
1 
 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Global Crime on 21 February 2014, 
available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/17440572.2014.882778 
 
Mythical numbers and the proceeds of organized crime: Estimating the 
mafia proceeds in Italy 
Francesco Calderoni  
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore and Transcrime, Milan, Italy 
Abstract: Organized crime is a field vulnerable to mythical numbers, i.e. exaggerated 
estimates lacking empirical support, but acquiring acceptance through repetition. The 
figures on mafia proceeds in Italy are a striking example of this problem. This study 
proposes an estimation of mafia proceeds in Italy from nine criminal activities (sexual 
exploitation of women, illicit firearms trafficking, drug trafficking, counterfeiting, the 
illicit cigarette trade, illicit gambling, illicit waste disposal, loan sharking, and extortion 
racketeering) by region and type of mafia (Cosa Nostra, Camorra, ‘Ndrangheta, 
Apulian mafias, and other mafias). The results estimate yearly mafia proceeds at 
approximately €10.7 bn (0.7% of the Italian GDP), discussing the impact on the 
regional and national economies and the differences among the types of mafias as to 
their geographical sources of revenues. 
Keywords: proceeds of crime; mafia proceeds; Italian mafias; organized crime; 
estimating criminal revenues; criminal markets. 
Introduction 
Crime has always been the favorite field for the purveyors of mythical numbers. 
Mythical numbers are estimates of a phenomenon inevitably overstating its size while lacking 
empirical support. Nevertheless, they gain acceptance by policymakers, the media, public 
opinion and, sometimes, scholars due to their repetition “as gospel numbers that have no real 
basis in fact”.1 Indeed, practitioners and academics in the crime field often know very well 
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that “because an estimate has been used widely by a variety of people who should know what 
they are talking about, one cannot assume that the estimate is even approximately correct”.2  
According to Reuter, there are three main reasons for the success of mythical 
numbers.
3
 First, there is no constituency for accurate numbers, while there is interest in 
keeping figures high. Second, scholars in the field may have no interest in correct 
estimations. Third, and most importantly, mythical numbers persist because they have almost 
no impact on policies.  
The vitality of mythical numbers is attributable to the increasing importance of 
quantification for public policies. The advancement of sciences in different domains has 
improved mankind’s capacity to measure natural and social phenomena. Increasingly, figures 
are the main subject of policy debates, and there is increasing demand for evidence-based 
policies. This generates its own supply of estimates which, “particularly in newer areas of 
policy making, are frequently of poor quality and difficult to evaluate”.4 
Almost thirty years ago, Reuter claimed that such figures have scant impact on actual 
policies, but he also predicted that the trend would increase further. He also argued that the 
problem is difficult to prevent, due to governments’ need to back up their claims with (any) 
evidence; the self-driving appetite of public agencies for resources; the difficulty of refuting 
bad estimates with better ones (particularly in new policy areas); and the uncritical 
exploitation of mythical numbers by politicians, policymakers, and stakeholders in general.
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Notwithstanding the development of criminology in recent years, it is hard to argue 
that the above arguments are today devoid of any relevance. Mythical numbers still enjoy 
great success as new crime threats develop: consider the frequent alarming claims by public 
agencies and by private businesses on the threats of cybercrime.
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The field of organized crime is even more exposed to mythical numbers. Since its 
early stages, the public and scholarly debate on organized crime has been affected by 
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unsubstantiated claims devoid of empirical support. The notion of organized crime gained 
public importance throughout the twentieth century due to political pressures, simplifications, 
and stereotypes. After the end of WWII, organized crime in the US was depicted as an alien 
conspiracy by a small number of Sicilian or Italian mafiosi, and this stereotype is still very 
common.
7
 Despite the criticisms of scholars, the concept was successfully exported to other 
countries with strategies of moral panic and securitization.
8
 At the same time, the general 
understanding of organized crime remained vague, with scholars discussing its social 
construction, mystique and paradoxes.
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The attempts by national and international institutions to address and quantify 
organized crime met with criticism by academics.
10
 The media and public opinion are still 
strongly influenced by mythical numbers on organized crime. For example, a 2011 study by 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reviewed a number of estimates of 
money-laundering and identified a consensus share of world GDP equal to US$870 bn in 
2009.
11
 While the report was cautious about the reliability of the estimates, the figure rapidly 
became a mythical number. UNODC’s Director declared “We are able to quantify the cost of 
transnational organized crime, it is US$870 billion, but we cannot calculate the misery and 
suffering caused to millions of people by these illicit activities”.12 The UN agency also 
launched a public awareness campaign which received worldwide media attention.
13
  
The persistence of mythical numbers about organized crime shows most of the 
features already mentioned. A small, but well-organized, constituency of governments, 
international organizations, and non-governmental agencies has an interest in keeping such 
numbers high, while the interest in accurate estimates is widespread among citizens.
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Debunking such mythical numbers is difficult and unrewarding – any criticisms may be 
perceived as attempts to minimize the issue of organized crime.
15
 Policies are only marginally 
affected by the estimates. Governments are unable to measure the performance of such 
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policies, so that there is limited interest in questioning the mythical numbers about organized 
crime.  
This situation entails several negative consequences. These numbers may disseminate 
stereotypes in the population, stimulate xenophobia, heighten the fear of crime, and distort 
perceptions of what the real problems are. They may ultimately affect the establishment of 
effective and efficient policies to reduce organized crime.  
The long-term solution to the problem may be the integration of estimates of 
organized crime activities into the policy process.
16
 However, this requires establishment of a 
number of preconditions addressing the causes of the persistence of mythical numbers. Data 
collection on organized crime should improve; estimation methodologies should be 
transparent; and scholars should participate in the process more actively than they are 
currently willing. These preconditions may contribute to informing public opinion and 
making the success of mythical numbers less likely.  
Considering that “it is easy to point to the failings of the first ‘measurement’ but often 
hard to produce a convincing alternative”17, this article opts for the hard path. It tackles the 
problems of estimating the proceeds of organized crime with an attempt to estimate the 
revenues of the mafias in Italy which uses a specifically designed method. It addresses 
questions such as: What is the income of the mafias in Italy? How is it distributed across 
Italian regions and types of mafia? The study is inspired by a research project conducted by 
Transcrime for the Italian Ministry of Interior, which analyzed investments by mafias in Italy 
and abroad.
18
 The results estimate yearly mafia proceeds at approximately €10.7 bn (0.7% of 
the Italian GDP), with extortion racketeering as the main source of income. Camorra and 
‘Ndrangheta are the mafias with the highest revenues (€3,3 bn and nearly €3 bn, 
respectively), totaling more than 68% of total mafia proceeds. Also, the ‘Ndrangheta has 
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successfully diversified its source of income, with only 28% of the revenues coming from the 
native region (Calabria).  
The other sections of the article are organized as follows: the next section discusses 
mythical numbers about mafia proceeds in Italy. The third section describes the methodology 
and its limitations, while the fourth one presents and discusses the results. The last section 
concludes.  
Mafia mythical numbers in Italy 
Despite the abundant literature on mafias, in the past decade mythical numbers have 
gained increasing importance in Italy. While public institutions have traditionally refrained 
from producing estimates, mythical numbers have developed as a result of the 
misinterpretation and uncritical repetition of figures developed by a few academic studies and 
non-governmental organizations.  
The most frequently cited mythical numbers on the mafias in Italy are two estimates 
of their proceeds or revenues. The first mythical number states that mafia revenues amount to 
approximately €150 bn yearly, and it is frequently attributed to the Bank of Italy, the 
country’s central bank. The second mythical number is €138 bn, which allegedly corresponds 
to the annual turnover of the so-called “Mafia Inc.” and was created by SOS Impresa, a non-
governmental association of entrepreneurs against extortion racketeering. The account of the 
birth and evolution of these figures provides impeccable examples of the problems of 
mythical numbers.
19
  
The €150 bn number is approximately 10% of Italy’s GDP, and it originated from 
studies, published in academic journals and in a paper series of the Bank of Italy, measuring 
the underground and illegal economy by means of econometric models. In 2008, Argentiero 
et al. estimated the money laundered yearly from 1981 to 2001 at approximately 12% of 
Italian GDP.
20
 In 2012, Ardizzi and colleagues estimated the underground economy from the 
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demand for cash (using the ratio between withdrawals from current accounts and non-cash 
payments as the dependent variable).
21
 For the period 2005-2008, the study estimated the 
underground and criminal economy at 16.5% and 10.9% of GDP, respectively. Estimation of 
the criminal economy was based on reported drug trafficking and exploitation of prostitution 
offences. Whilst the study adopted an interesting macroeconomic approach, the variables for 
the criminal economy raise questions about their reliability. As well known, official statistics 
on these offences have a high “dark” number. Reports mostly depend on the priorities and 
intensity of activity of the law enforcement agencies and on the more or less prohibitionist 
stances taken by governments towards drugs and prostitution. Given these considerations, the 
resulting estimates should have been treated with extreme caution. A subsequent 
development of the study by the same authors using a different model produced substantially 
lower estimates (money laundering by the criminal economy was assessed at between 6.6% 
and 8% of GDP).
22
 Nevertheless, the numbers were cited (along with others) by Anna Maria 
Tarantola, the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Italy, at a hearing of 6 June 2012 before the 
Parliamentary Antimafia Commission. Tarantola declared that “evaluations that have used 
different methodologies must be analyzed with extreme caution; they may suggest the huge 
economic importance of the phenomenon, but they do not allow accurate calculation”.23 
Notwithstanding Tarantola’s cautions, the machine generating a mythical number soon 
started. The Antimafia Commission classified the total amount of €150 bn as the “annual 
turnover of domestic mafias”, attributing it to “the police and various institutions”.24 Thus the 
original estimate, which referred to the criminal economy in general, was already being 
attributed to organized crime alone. In March 2012, the European Commission, on proposing 
a new EU Directive on proceeds of crime, stated that “there are no reliable estimates of the 
size of criminal profits in the European Union, but in Italy the proceeds of organised crime 
laundered in 2011 have been estimated by the Bank of Italy at €150 bn”.25 A video produced 
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by the Directorate General Home Affairs of the European Commission stated that “in Italy 
organized crime revenues have been estimated at €150 bn”.26 The international media 
promptly leapt on the news. The figure enjoyed wide success and was attributed to the UN or 
the Bank of Italy, or it was just unreferenced.
27
  
The €138 bn number comes from the thirteenth edition of the report entitled The 
Hands of Criminality on Enterprises (Le mani della criminalità sulle imprese) by SOS 
Impresa, a non-governmental association campaigning against the mafias. In its ninth report 
of 2006, SOS Impresa provocatively coined the expression Mafia SpA (i.e. “Mafia Inc.”).28 
The thirteen report of 2012 estimated Mafia Spa’s yearly revenues for 2010 at €138.09 bn, 
with profits amounting to €104.70 bn and cash assets to €65.64 bn.29 The report did not 
clarify its methodology, raising a number of doubts about its reliability. For example, drug 
trafficking yearly revenues – the prime source of income for the Mafia SpA – were estimated 
at €65 bn. This figure is higher than other national estimates (ranging between €6 and €9 bn 
euros, in only two cases reaching €23 bn; see the article on drug trafficking in this double 
special issue) and even higher than the estimates of the European cocaine market (US$35.6 
bn dollars in 2009.
30
 A study by the UNODC questioned the SOS Impresa estimates, arguing 
that they are “most probably gross overestimates”.31 Nevertheless, the results were massively 
reported in the media, including the international ones.
32
 In particular, a particularly 
successful claim was that, given its liquidity, “Mafia Inc. is the first bank in Italy”.33  
Despite the claim by scholars that mythical numbers have no impact on actual 
policies, the successful careers of the above-mentioned numbers may prove, at least partially, 
the contrary. For example, the numbers were used by the UN and the European Commission 
to call for further resources and policy actions in the fight against organized crime. 
Furthermore, during the campaign for the Italian 2013 parliamentary elections, some parties 
argued that the financial resources to redress the country’s economy should be obtained by 
8 
 
confiscating mafia proceeds.
34
 This shows that unreliable estimates can be the basis for 
policies which, in their turn, are likely to fail owing to the untrustworthiness of the initial 
assumptions. 
These considerations suggest that there is a need for better and more consistent 
estimations of mafia proceeds in Italy. The lack of reliable methodologies is an opportunity 
for the creation of mythical numbers which may have a significant impact not only on the 
general perception in the media and public opinion but also on the policies designed to 
prevent and fight mafias. 
Methodology 
Given the vitality of unreliable figures on the mafia proceeds, this study undertakes the 
daunting task of developing a new, transparent and more reliable methodology with which to 
estimate mafia revenues. Owing to the lack of previous studies on the revenues of organized 
crime, the methods and the results of this study do not claim to be the final word on the 
subject, but rather a first, exploratory attempt whose purpose is to enable better knowledge 
and better analyses in the future.  
This study is inspired by a research project conducted by Transcrime for the Ministry 
of Interior.
35
 One of the main tasks of Transcrime’s project was to estimate the proceeds of 
crime deriving from a number of criminal activities in Italy. This article is based on estimates 
updated and revised according to most recent available data. The results are in line with those 
presented in Transcrime’s report, with some differences due to the just mentioned updates. 
The analysis of mafia proceeds presented in this article took a bottom-up approach 
similar to the one adopted by the above-mentioned study by Transcrime. Instead of 
estimating the proceeds of all criminal activities with a common methodology, it was 
preferred to select a number of criminal activities and markets and develop a specific 
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estimation for each of them. The criminal activities were selected by applying two main 
criteria. The first was the frequent association in the literature and official sources of a 
criminal activity with the mafias. The second criterion was the availability of information and 
data enabling estimation of the revenues generated by each activity in a transparent, reliable 
and replicable way. As a result of the selection, the analysis focused on 1) sexual exploitation 
of women, 2) illicit firearms trafficking, 3) drug trafficking, 4) counterfeiting of goods, 5) 
illicit cigarette trade, 6) illicit gambling 7) illicit waste disposal, 8) loan sharking and 9) 
extortion racketeering. The methodology and estimates are discussed in greater detail in the 
previous articles of this double-special issue.  
The methodology consisted in three steps: 
(1) estimation of the proceeds of crime from selected criminal markets and activities; 
(2) allocation of a share of the proceeds of crime to mafia proceeds; 
(3) distribution of the mafia proceeds among different types of mafias. 
Estimation of the proceeds of crime from nine criminal activities 
The illegal revenues for each activity were estimated at both the national and regional level. 
Each estimation adopted different methodologies according to the specificities of the criminal 
market, previous evaluations in the literature, and the availability of data.  
The analysis considered only the midpoint estimates for each criminal activity (Table 
1). Overall, the sum of the revenues from the criminal activities selected amounted to more 
than €22 bn, equal to approximately 1.5% of Italian GDP (average 2007-2011) or €379 per 
resident (average 2007-2012). Extortion, loan sharking, sexual exploitation, counterfeiting 
and drugs accounted for more than 85% of the criminal revenues.  
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Table 1. Proceeds of crime by criminal activity in Italy. Midpoint estimates (€bn) and shares 
of the total. 
 
Year Proceeds of crime 
 
Share of total r 
Trafficking & sexual exploitation 2004-05 & 2008-09 3081.34 12.6% 
Firearms 2010 93.47 0.4% 
Drugs 2008-2012 3310.70 13.5% 
Counterfeiting 2008 4541.27 18.6% 
Gambling 2011 424.56 1.7% 
Waste 2007-2010 405.33 1.7% 
Cigarettes 2012 1139.06 4.7% 
Loan Sharking 2012 4634.22 18.9% 
Extortion racketeering 2012 5252.55 21.5% 
Total  22882.49  
Source: author’s elaboration  
Allocation of a share of the proceeds of crime to the mafias in general 
The analysis allocated a share of the proceeds of crime to the mafias (Mafia Proceeds). The 
allocation was conducted for each criminal activity and region and calculated a minimum and 
a maximum share. The calculation of Mafia Proceeds was based on the following formulas, 
where x is one of the selected criminal activities:  
Mafia Proceeds xregmax=Illegal Revenues xreg·Theoretical Share  xmax ·Effective Share reg 
Mafia proceeds x
regmin
=Illegal Revenues x
reg
·Theoretical Share xmin·Effective Sharereg 
Estimation of the mafia proceeds moved through two phases.  
The first phase estimated what part of each illegal activity was theoretically 
controllable by the mafias (Theoretical Share). Considering the exploratory nature of the 
analysis, it identified minimum and maximum (theoretical) shares. As far as possible, the 
shares were differentiated by sub-activities (e.g. for different types of drugs) on the basis of 
specific considerations regarding control by criminal organizations (Table 2). The main 
assumption was that mafias are unable to achieve monopoly at the regional level in any 
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criminal activity, with the sole exception of extortion racketeering, which is considered 
typical of mafias. This assumption was grounded on the findings in the criminological 
literature on criminal markets. Criminal activities are normally undertaken by a wide array of 
actors, and it would be incorrect to assume that mafias control or monopolize any of them. 
Studies have highlighted that, with the exception of extortion racketeering, criminal activities 
at the national and regional level are not monopolized by mafias. The most significant 
example is provided by the drugs market. The literature has constantly rejected the hypothesis 
of monopoly and oligopoly by large structured mafias.
36
 These results have been confirmed 
also in Italy, except for some small areas, e.g. villages or city neighborhoods, where elements 
of mafia monopoly have been observed.
37
  
Table 2. Minimum and maximum Theoretical Share per criminal activity. 
Activities Sub-activities Min max 
Sexual exploitation 20 40 
Firearms 20 40 
Drugs Heroin 40 80 
Cocaine 40 80 
Cannabis 30 50 
Amphetamines 10 30 
Ecstasy 10 30 
Counterfeiting 10 50 
Gambling 20 80 
Illegal waste trade Non-hazardous waste 20 60 
Hazardous waste 30 80 
Illicit tobacco trade 20 80 
Loan sharking 40 80 
Extortion 100 100 
Source: author’s elaboration  
The second phase consisted in estimation of the share of each activity effectively controlled 
by the mafias (Effective Share). It was assumed that, although it is theoretically possible to 
control a given share of a criminal market, a mafia must have a strong presence to do so. 
Therefore the main assumption was that in regions where mafias have a stronger presence, 
they are effectively able to control a share of illegal activities equal to the one theoretically 
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controllable. In regions where mafias have a lower presence, by contrast, they do not have the 
operational capacity and connections to do so, and they may actually control only a fraction 
of what they could.  
Mafia presence was measured by means of the Mafia Presence Index (MPI) 
developed by Transcrime for the Italian Ministry of the Interior.
38
 Design of the MPI was 
based on previous attempts to measure the presence of mafias across Italian provinces in a 
reliable though efficient way.
39
 The index is the arithmetic mean of five normalised variables 
(maximum value=1000): 
(1) reported mafia murders and attempted mafia murders, average of annual rates per 
10,000 inhabitants, 2004-2011. 
(2) people reported for mafia-type criminal association, average of annual rates per 
10,000 inhabitants, 2004-2011. 
(3) city councils dissolved for mafia infiltration, number of times, 2000-August 2012. 
(4) assets confiscated from criminal organizations, rate per 10,000 inhabitants, 2000-
2011. 
(5) groups reported by the Direzione Investigativa Antimafia (Investigative Antimafia 
Directorate, DIA) and the Direzione Nazionale Antimafia (National Antimafia 
Directorate, DNA), average reported groups per year, 2000-2011.
40
 In total, the 
analysis covered 24 semi-annual DIA reports (from the first half of 2000 to the second 
half of 2011), and 11 annual DNA reports (2000-2011).
41
 For each report, the study 
recorded individual criminal groups, the types of criminal organization, and the area 
in which they were present (municipality or province).
42
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Figure 1. Mafia Presence Index at the municipal, provincial and regional levels (2000-2011). 
 
Source: author’s elaboration onTranscrime data 
The MPI measured the presence of mafias in Italy at the municipal level. Aggregation at the 
provincial and regional level provided synthetically analyzable variables (Figure 1 and Table 
3).
43
 The regional scores of the MPI should be interpreted with caution. The strong mafia 
presence in a few southern regions – especially Campania, where the Camorra is traditionally 
characterized by numerous small groups and a very high number of mafia murders – leads to 
a considerable concentration of the MPI values. However, also relatively low values can 
indicate a significant mafia presence able to influence criminal markets, as well as the legal 
economy and politics. For this reason, the study divided the twenty Italian regions into 
quintiles. It assigned to each quintile a parameter (Effective Share) representing the share of 
illegal activities effectively controlled by mafias in the theoretically controllable share. 
Therefore, the Effective Share for the first quintile, corresponding to the regions with the 
highest MPI values, was 100%, 80% for the second, 60% for the third, 40% for the fourth, 
and 20% for the last quintile (Table 3). The calculation of Mafia Proceeds generated 
minimum and maximum values corresponding to the hypotheses of low or high mafia control 
of each a criminal market.  
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Table 3. Mafia Presence Index and Effective Share per region 
Region Mafia Presence Index Effective Share 
Campania 61.21 1 
Calabria 41.76 1 
Sicily 31.80 1 
Apulia 17.84 1 
Lazio 16.83 0.8 
Liguria 10.44 0.8 
Piedmont 6.11 0.8 
Basilicata 5.32 0.8 
Lombardy 4.17 0.6 
Tuscany 2.16 0.6 
Umbria 1.68 0.6 
Emilia-Romagna 1.44 0.6 
Abruzzo 0.74 0.4 
Sardinia 0.70 0.4 
Marche 0.67 0.4 
Valle d'Aosta 0.57 0.4 
Friuli Venezia Giulia 0.42 0.2 
Veneto 0.41 0.2 
Trentino-Alto Adige 0.37 0.2 
Molise 0.31 0.2 
Source: author’s elaboration on Transcrime data 
Distribution of mafia proceeds among different types of mafias 
The analysis distributed mafia proceeds among the five main types of mafia: Cosa Nostra, 
Camorra, ‘Ndrangheta, Apulian mafias, and other mafias. This estimation was conducted for 
each criminal activity, region and type of mafia. The calculations were based on the 
following formulas (example for the proceeds attributable to Cosa Nostra): 
CN Proceeds xregmax= Mafia Proceeds xmaxreg· % Presence CNreg  
CN Proceeds xregmin=Mafia Proceeds xminreg· % Presence CNreg  
where x is one of the selected criminal activities and Mafia Proceeds are calculated as 
described in the previous subsection.  
Analysis of the distribution of the five types of mafia across Italian regions was based on the 
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number of groups reported by the DIA and the DNA from 2000 to 2011 (variable 5 of the 
MPI). As displayed in Figure 2, the five types of mafia concentrate in different areas of Italy.  
Figure 2. Presence of Cosa Nostra, Camorra, ‘Ndrangheta, Apulian mafias and other criminal 
organizations in Italy (2000-2011). 
 
Source: author’s elaboration on Transcrime data 
The relative presence of each type of mafia at the municipal level was calculated as the ratio 
between the average number of groups of mafia type i and the total number of mafia groups 
(% Presence CN in the above formula). The resulting coefficients measured the share 
attributable to Cosa Nostra, Camorra, ‘Ndrangheta, Apulian mafias and other mafias, 
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respectively. Aggregation at the regional level (weighting each municipal ratio by the 
resident population 2004-2010) yielded regional scores of mafia presence by type (Table 4). 
Table 4. Share of mafia presence by type of mafia and region. 
Region Cosa Nostra Camorra ‘Ndrangheta Apulian OC  Other OC 
Abruzzo 8.9% 80.6% 6.1% 4.5% 0.0% 
Basilicata 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 99.4% 
Calabria 0.0% 0.1% 99.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
Campania 0.0% 99.8% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Emilia R. 8.8% 24.4% 66.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
Friuli-V.G. 73.9% 24.3% 1,8% 0,0% 0,0% 
Lazio 31,0% 35,6% 30,4% 0,7% 2,2% 
Liguria 22,7% 7,0% 70,3% 0,0% 0.0% 
Lombardy 11.6% 29.2% 53.1% 5.0% 1.1% 
Marche  7.0% 21.5% 54.8% 16.7% 0.0% 
Molise 0.2% 93.4% 2.7% 3.7% 0.0% 
Piedmont 2.9% 1.1% 95.2% 0.0% 0.8% 
Apulia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
Sardinia 0.0% 71.0% 27.8% 0.0% 1.3% 
Sicily 91.1% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 8.5% 
Tuscany 5.9% 57.7% 34.9% 1.5% 0.0% 
Trentino A.A. 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Umbria 5.6% 59.1% 35.4% 0.0% 0.0% 
V. d'Aosta 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Veneto 5.4% 12.5% 37.3% 0.9% 43.9% 
NB: the sum of the regional shares may differ from 100 because of rounding.  
Source: author’s elaboration on Transcrime data 
Limitations 
The discussion of mythical numbers and mafias in Italy has highlighted that this field of 
study has been rather neglected in past years. The lack of serious studies has required 
development of a new, exploratory methodology which inevitably has a number of 
limitations.  
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Estimating the proceeds of crime is a complex task which unavoidably implies 
assumptions and, not infrequently, simplifications. The analysis reported here used the 
bottom-up approach adopted in Transcrime’s report for the Italian Ministry of the Interior. It 
selected a limited number of criminal activities according to the frequency of the association 
in the literature and official reports of each activity with mafias, and the availability of data. 
This approach entailed that the selection of the activities was crucial in defining the scope of 
the estimates, and the limited number of activities examined may have underestimated mafia 
proceeds. For example, the lack of data prevented any exploration of corruption (e.g. public 
contracts awarded to mafia-related enterprises in exchange for bribes or other favors), sport 
betting (e.g. match fixing in football championships), urban waste disposal (e.g. revenues 
from the illicit disposal of urban waste).  
Also the allocation of a share of the proceeds of crime to mafias encountered several 
difficulties. First, while a number of studies reject the hypothesis that organized crime 
monopolizes criminal markets, there is no research on the actual “market share” of criminal 
organizations. This deficiency required adoption of an exploratory approach which assigned 
to each criminal activity a share which might theoretically be controlled by organized crime 
(minimum-maximum range). This process was based on various sources and assumptions 
(e.g. the relevance of a given criminal market for the mafias, technical and operational 
requirements, and the fragmentation of markets). Unfortunately, it was impossible to 
establish clear criteria for selection of the above-mentioned shares, and the choices adopted in 
this study may seem nothing more than informed guesswork. However, compared with the 
existing mythical numbers, the approach adopted here is more conservative, in that it rejects 
the idea of a mafia monopoly and identifies a range of mafia market shares. Second, the MPI 
may be influenced by the reliability and availability of the variables used to calculate it. A 
previous study in the literature has analyzed the reliability of measurement of mafia presence 
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based on four out of the five variables included in the MPI. It also compared the results with 
another index comprising a larger number of variables, finding a very high and significant 
correlation.
44
 These findings suggest that the MPI is a reliable instrument with which to 
measure the mafia presence in Italy.  
The distribution of criminal proceeds among the different types of mafia also has 
limitations. First, it is closely dependent on the data extracted by Transcrime from the reports 
of the DIA and DNA. The analysis may be biased by the law enforcement agencies’ 
perceptions. Nevertheless, both the DIA and the DNA are highly specialized bodies with 
more than twenty years of experience in the field. Their reports provide a wealth of 
information and are organized into sections devoted to the different mafias and regions. 
Transcrime’s study analyzed tens of thousands of pages recording the groups reported in each 
municipality and province. The measurement was consistent with the findings in the 
literature, the media, and other official accounts (Figure 2). In the absence of any better 
analysis, the breakdown provided by Transcrime appears to be the most reliable proxy of the 
presence of the various mafias. A second limitation was that it was not possible to 
differentiate among different types of mafias, and the study assumed that all of them may 
have the same prevalence in a given criminal market. This was due to a lack of evidence 
which prevented the drawing of any reliable distinctions.  
The above considerations recommend caution in interpreting the result of this study. 
The aim of the analysis is not to pass final judgment on the topic of mafia proceeds, but 
rather to explore possible estimation methods taking account of the main results in the 
literature. The findings should be considered as those of a first attempt to quantify the 
revenues of the mafias in Italy using a replicable and clearly described methodology. They 
may provide the basis for future studies using more refined approaches, which will most 
likely depend on the availability of better data.  
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Results and discussion 
Mafia proceeds 
Table 5 reports the yearly estimates of mafia proceeds by activity and region. At national 
level, the revenues of the mafias from the criminal activities selected range between a 
minimum of €8.4 bn to a maximum of €13 bn. Compared with the total illegal revenues 
(midpoint estimate €22.8 bn), those attributable to the mafias may vary between 37% and 
57%. They represent between 0.6% and 0.9% of GDP and between €141 and €218 per 
resident. Since the criminal activities considered are only a selection of the sources of 
revenues for mafias, their magnitude compared with the national economy is significant.  
Extortion racketeering is the main source of mafia revenues, yielding more than €5.2 
bn, equal to 49% of the total amount (considering the midpoint estimate between the 
minimum and maximum values). It is followed by loan sharking (20%) and drugs (11%) and 
counterfeiting (8%) (Figure 3).  
These results suggest that closer attention should be paid to extortion racketeering and 
usury, particularly considering the widespread idea that mafias derive most of their incomes 
from drugs. These findings receive some support in the literature. One theoretical approach to 
mafias treats them as suppliers of private protection, an activity where they can exploit their 
specialization in the use of violence.
45
 While extortion and private protection are different, 
though sometimes overlapping, concepts, the focus on these activities highlights their key 
function for mafias instead of other criminal markets, e.g. drug trafficking.
46
 Other scholars 
have demonstrated that criminal markets are not particularly suited to large structured groups 
like mafias.
47
 The frequent assumptions that a) criminal markets are monopolized by mafias, 
and that b) the provision of illicit goods and services is their main activity, have been shown 
to be paradoxes rather than empirically–based facts.48 While in line with the literature, the 
particular role of extortion racketeering was one of the main assumptions of the analysis 
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(which attributed 100% of the estimated revenues to mafias) and this inevitably affected its 
share in total mafia proceeds. Yet the estimated revenues are higher than those deriving from 
any other of the selected activities. Differently from the Transcrime report, the update of the 
estimates resulted in extortion revenues higher than those from drugs because of the different 
years considered (drug consumption may have declined due to economic difficulties) and 
estimation methodologies used.  
Closer attention to extortion racketeering may have significant implications. Indeed, it 
may partially contribute to explaining the differences in economic performance between Italy 
and other developed countries. While all the latter record high levels of drug consumption, 
only Italy has a strong mafia presence on its territory. A number of studies have shown that 
the mafia impacts on various elements of economic performance, from the general economic 
structure
49
 to regional GDP growth
50, firms’ productivity,51 and foreign direct investments.52 
All these effects may be associated with the mafias’ extortion racketeering, which is likely to 
affect the local and national economy more than criminal markets like drug trafficking.  
Loan sharking may share some of the considerations that apply to extortion 
racketeering. Violence, threats, and intimidation are important assets for success in the usury 
market. While some criminal entrepreneurs may resort to external enforcers, mafias have a 
reputation which may effectively facilitate the in-house recovery of credit in the case of need. 
A number of investigations have shown that mafias may use loan sharking as a means to gain 
control of enterprises and shops with mechanisms that closely resemble extortion 
racketeering.
53
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Figure 3. Share of mafia proceeds by criminal activity. Average estimates. 
 
Source: author’s elaboration  
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Table 5. Mafia proceeds by activity and region. Minimum and maximum estimates (€mn). 
Region  
Traff. & 
sexual ex. 
Firearms Drugs 
Counterfeit
ing 
Gambling Waste Cigarettes 
Loan 
Sharking 
Extortion 
racket 
Total 
Abruzzo 
min 6.82 0.14 9.16 3.96 0.21 0.63 2.08 24.74 58.14 105.88 
max 13.65 0.28 18.09 19.78 0.83 1.89 8.31 49.48 58.14 170.46 
Basilicata 
min 5.75 0.22 6.70 2.67 1.38 0.58 0.79 25.16 23.87 67.13 
max 11.51 0.43 13.23 13.36 5.50 1.73 3.17 50.33 23.87 123.13 
Calabria 
min 8.72 1.04 30.92 11.96 5.50 1.27 2.63 114.48 626.46 802.97 
max 17.44 2.07 61.48 59.78 21.99 3.79 10.52 228.97 626.46 1,032.49 
Campania 
min 28.64 2.22 137.47 42.54 12.23 4.71 65.18 324.85 1,538.90 2,156.73 
max 57.27 4.43 273.65 212.69 48.94 14.02 260.72 649.69 1,538.90 3,060.31 
Emilia-
Romagna 
min 17.64 0.57 48.87 22.37 0.69 3.71 6.10 32.21 131.58 263.73 
max 35.28 1.14 97.15 111.84 2.75 10.96 24.40 64.42 131.58 479.52 
Friuli-V.G. 
min 6.84 0.07 3.11 2.43 0.34 0.44 2.32 4.01 40.97 60.52 
max 13.67 0.14 6.14 12.14 1.37 1.30 9.27 8.02 40.97 93.02 
Lazio 
min 83.35 1.23 70.87 34.74 4.58 5.47 10.41 145.04 208.55 564.24 
max 166.70 2.46 141.35 173.71 18.32 16.31 41.63 290.08 208.55 1,059.10 
Liguria 
min 24.37 0.59 37.30 9.91 0.08 1.44 2.13 41.82 59.16 176.79 
max 48.73 1.18 74.18 49.53 0.31 4.26 8.53 83.65 59.16 329.52 
Lombardy 
min 57.46 0.87 133.67 46.29 1.99 6.43 21.08 88.46 232.69 588.96 
max 114.92 1.75 268.88 231.44 7.97 18.92 84.33 176.93 232.69 1,137.84 
Marche 
min 8.93 0.16 10.72 4.11 0.22 1.34 1.46 19.69 111.60 158.24 
max 17.85 0.32 21.10 20.57 0.89 4.01 5.84 39.39 111.60 221.57 
Molise 
min 0.66 0.03 1.34 0.38 0.03 0.13 0.16 3.36 17.86 23.93 
max 1.32 0.05 2.66 1.88 0.10 0.38 0.64 6.72 17.86 31.61 
Piedmont 
min 38.35 0.81 76.29 23.67 9.33 3.85 10.30 95.98 252.64 511.21 
max 76.70 1.61 150.94 118.34 37.30 11.36 41.20 191.96 252.64 882.05 
Apulia 
min 20.41 2.00 65.41 25.68 10.55 6.73 7.04 193.37 516.67 847.87 
max 40.82 4.00 129.99 128.41 42.21 20.12 28.16 386.74 516.67 1,297.12 
Sardinia 
min 2.67 0.17 17.81 4.04 4.13 1.24 2.18 29.28 35.41 96.93 
max 5.35 0.33 35.47 20.19 16.53 3.69 8.70 58.56 35.41 184.24 
Sicily 
min 25.31 1.49 66.85 30.76 16.68 6.69 14.58 214.74 756.66 1,133.75 
max 50.62 2.98 132.87 153.78 66.71 19.16 58.34 429.48 756.66 1,670.60 
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Source: author’s elaboration  
Tuscany 
min 19.95 0.99 37.73 17.03 1.01 6.15 6.14 54.97 218.41 362.38 
max 39.91 1.98 74.47 85.15 4.03 18.37 24.57 109.94 218.41 576.82 
Trentino-
Alto Adige 
min 3.86 0.04 3.78 1.59 0.01 0.45 0.59 0.02 39.85 50.19 
max 7.73 0.08 7.52 7.94 0.06 1.34 2.36 0.03 39.85 66.90 
Umbria 
min 16.17 0.38 8.29 3.63 0.22 1.37 1.20 16.55 26.20 74.00 
max 32.33 0.77 16.33 18.15 0.90 4.08 4.79 33.09 26.20 136.64 
Valle 
d'Aosta 
min 0.97 0.01 1.56 0.32 0.12 0.06 0.11 1.18 13.68 18.01 
max 1.94 0.01 3.12 1.60 0.50 0.17 0.43 2.37 13.68 23.82 
Veneto 
min 10.54 0.36 15.53 10.51 0.14 1.62 4.28 15.35 343.26 401.59 
max 21.09 0.73 30.84 52.57 0.54 4.78 17.14 30.70 343.26 501.64 
Total Italy 
min 387.41 13.38 783.38 298.57 69.44 54.31 160.76 1,445.27 5,252.55 8,465.05 
max 774.82 26.76 1,559.48 1,492.85 277.75 160.63 643.04 2,890.54 5,252.55 13,078.41 
avg 581.12 20.07 1,171.43 895.71 173.59 107.47 401.90 2,167.90 5,252.55 10,771.73 
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At the regional level, the regions of origin of the mafias account for 55% of the mafia 
proceeds in Italy (Figure 4 and Figure 6). Campania records the highest mafia revenues 
(average €2.6 bn), followed by Sicily, Apulia and Calabria (€1.4 bn, €1 bn and €0.9 bn 
respectively). Lazio, Lombardy and Piedmont (in the Centre and North-West of Italy) 
also have high values (22%). Besides the methodological assumptions already 
discussed, possible explanations for these high levels may relate to the large populations 
of the three regions and the presence in them of the three big cities of Rome, Milan and 
Turin. Mafia proceeds from some of the richest and most developed regions in Italy 
represent an important share of the total, which further confirms that the mafias should 
be considered a national issue rather than a Southern peculiarity.  
Figure 4. Mafia proceeds by region (absolute values, €mn). Average (point), minimum 
and maximum estimates (error bars). 
Source: author’s elaboration  
The critical impact of the mafias on the economies of the four regions of origin emerges 
when the values are normalized for the regional GDP (average 2007-2011) (Figure 5). 
Mafia revenues are equal to nearly 3% of the regional GDP in Calabria and Campania, 
1.7% in Sicily, and 1.5% in Apulia. Other regions do not even come close to these 
figures. These results demonstrate that a strong mafia presence may generate proceeds 
equal to a substantial share of the regional economy. Given the limited number of 
activities selected, the figures are probably underestimations. Nevertheless, at these 
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levels, the mafias can easily influence the social, economic and political dynamics of 
the regions in which they operate. As already discussed, these considerations receive 
support from studies that have analyzed the negative impact of mafias across the Italian 
regions.
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Figure 5. Mafia proceeds as a share of regional GDP (average 2007-2011). Average 
(point), minimum and maximum estimates (error bars). 
 
Source: author’s elaboration  
The regional share of mafia revenues in total illegal revenues varies (Table 6 and Figure 
6). Regions with a traditional mafia presence record a share of mafia revenues 
amounting to between 50% and 80%. Only in four other regions (Basilicata, Lazio, 
Liguria and Piedmont) do the maximum mafia revenues equal or slightly exceed 50%. 
In all other regions, mafia revenues represent less than half of total illegal revenues, 
indicating that illegal activities are mostly undertaken by people not linked to mafias. 
Once again, although influenced by the methodological assumptions already discussed, 
the findings reveal a concentration of mafia activities in a relatively small number of 
regions, although not exclusively in the South. 
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
26 
 
Table 6. Mafia proceeds by region. Absolute values (€mn) and shares of average illegal 
revenues (minimum, maximum and average estimates). 
 Absolute values Shares of illegal revenues 
 min max avg min  max avg 
Abruzzo 105.9 170.5 138.2 21% 34% 28% 
Basilicata 67.1 123.1 95.1 31% 58% 44% 
Calabria 803.0 1,032.5 917.7 66% 85% 76% 
Campania 2,156.7 3,060.3 2,608.5 58% 82% 70% 
Emilia R. 263.7 479.5 371.6 24% 43% 33% 
Friuli V.G. 60.5 93.0 76.8 12% 18% 15% 
Lazio 564.2 1,059.1 811.7 28% 53% 40% 
Liguria 176.8 329.5 253.2 28% 53% 41% 
Lombardy 589.0 1,137.8 863.4 21% 41% 31% 
Marche  158.2 221.6 189.9 28% 39% 34% 
Molise 23.9 31.6 27.8 19% 26% 23% 
Piedmont 511.2 882.1 696.6 34% 58% 46% 
Apulia 847.9 1,297.1 1,072.5 51% 77% 64% 
Sardinia 96.9 184.2 140.6 17% 32% 24% 
Sicily 1,133.8 1,670.6 1,402.2 54% 79% 66% 
Tuscany 362.4 576.8 469.6 30% 48% 39% 
Trentino A.A. 50.2 66.9 58.5 17% 23% 20% 
Umbria 74.0 136.6 105.3 21% 38% 30% 
V. d'Aosta 18.0 23.8 20.9 32% 43% 37% 
Veneto 401.6 501.6 451.6 24% 29% 26% 
TOTAL 8,465.05 13,078.41 10,771.73 37% 57% 47% 
Source: author’s elaboration 
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Figure 6. Mafia and non-mafia proceeds by region. Average estimates (pie size=total 
criminal revenues from selected activities, €mn).  
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
Proceeds per type of mafia  
The allocation of the proceeds among the different types of mafias provides further 
information on the sources of income for Italian organized crime groups (Table 7). 
Overall, Camorra and ‘Ndrangheta earn approximately 68% of total mafia revenues 
(Figure 7). The Camorra earns between a minimum of €3.1 bn and a maximum of €4.7 
bn, and the ‘Ndrangheta between €2.5 and €4 bn. Cosa Nostra follows, with revenues 
between €1.4 and €2.3 bn. The revenues of Apulian mafias vary between €0.9 and €1.4 
bn. 
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Figure 7. Share of mafia proceeds by type of mafia. Average estimates. 
Source: author’s elaboration  
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Table 7. Mafia proceeds by region and type of mafia (€mn). Minimum and maximum 
estimates.  
Region  Cosa Nostra Camorra ‘Ndrangheta 
Apulian 
mafias 
Other 
mafias 
Total 
Abruzzo 
min 9.45 85.30 6.41 4.72 0.00 105.88 
max 15.21 137.32 10.32 7.61 0.00 170.46 
Basilicata 
min 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 66.75 67.13 
max 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.00 122.44 123.13 
Calabria 
min 0.05 1.13 801.79 0.00 0.00 802.97 
max 0.07 1.46 1,030.97 0.00 0.00 1,032.49 
Campani
a 
min 0.39 2,152.39 3.12 0.77 0.05 2,156.73 
max 0.55 3,054.16 4.43 1.09 0.08 3,060.31 
Emilia-
Romagna 
min 23.10 64.23 176.40 0.00 0.00 263.73 
max 42.01 116.79 320.72 0.00 0.00 479.52 
Friuli-
V.G. 
min 44.72 14.69 1.11 0.00 0.00 60.52 
max 68.74 22.57 1.71 0.00 0.00 93.02 
Lazio 
min 175.02 201.01 171.74 3.96 12.50 564.24 
max 328.53 377.32 322.36 7.44 23.46 1,059.10 
Liguria 
min 40.13 12.40 124.26 0.00 0.00 176.79 
max 74.80 23.12 231.61 0.00 0.00 329.52 
Lombardy 
min 68.60 171.76 312.96 29.36 6.27 588.96 
max 132.54 331.84 604.63 56.72 12.11 1,137.84 
Marche 
min 11.05 33.99 86.79 26.42 0.00 158.24 
max 15.48 47.59 121.52 36.99 0.00 221.57 
Molise 
min 0.06 22.34 0.64 0.89 0.00 23.93 
max 0.08 29.51 0.85 1.18 0.00 31.61 
Piedmont 
min 14.65 5.41 486.89 0.00 4.26 511.21 
max 25.27 9.34 840.09 0.00 7.35 882.05 
Apulia 
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 847.87 0.00 847.87 
max 0.00 0.00 0.00 1,297.12 0.00 1,297.12 
Sardinia 
min 0.00 68.80 26.91 0.00 1.23 96.93 
max 0.00 130.76 51.14 0.00 2.34 184.24 
Sicily 
min 1,032.42 0.00 5.33 0.00 96.00 1,133.75 
max 1,521.28 0.00 7.86 0.00 141.46 1,670.60 
Tuscany min 21.29 208.99 126.64 5.46 0.00 362.38 
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max 33.89 332.66 201.58 8.69 0.00 576.82 
Trentino-
Alto Adige 
min 0.00 0.00 50.19 0.00 0.00 50.19 
max 0.00 0.00 66.90 0.00 0.00 66.90 
Umbria 
min 4.12 43.70 26.18 0.00 0.00 74.00 
max 7.61 80.69 48.34 0.00 0.00 136.64 
Valle 
d'Aosta 
min 0.00 0.00 18.01 0.00 0.00 18.01 
max 0.00 0.00 23.82 0.00 0.00 23.82 
Veneto 
min 21.56 50.30 149.85 3.49 176.39 401.59 
max 26.93 62.83 187.18 4.35 220.34 501.64 
Total 
Italy 
min 1,466.63 3,136.45 2,575.59 922.93 363.46 8,465.05 
max 2,292.99 4,757.95 4,076.72 1,421.18 529.57 13,078.41 
avg 1,879.81 3,947.20 3,326.15 1,172.06 446.52 10,771.73 
Source: author’s elaboration  
These findings suggest that Cosa Nostra has faced difficulties in recent years due to 
strong government action since the beginning of the 1990s.
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 Moreover, the majority of 
Cosa Nostra’s revenues come from its native Sicily (approximately 68%, Figure 8). 
Both the Camorra and the ‘Ndrangheta outmatch the revenues of the Sicilian Mafia. 
While the raw figures for the two types of mafia are similar, there are significant 
differences in the structure of the organizations and the geographical distribution of 
their sources of revenue. The Camorra has been traditionally a constellation of different 
clans and groups, with a prevalently horizontal organization. With the exception of a 
few specific periods and groups (e.g. the Casalesi group as described in Gomorrah by 
Saviano),
56
 there have been no successful attempts to centralize or coordinate the 
various groups.
57
 The high rates of mafia murders in Naples confirm that violent 
conflicts among these syndicates are frequent. The Camorra groups derive most of their 
revenues from Campania (66%, Figure 8), their region of origin, and particularly from 
the provinces of Naples and Caserta (Casalesi territory). These findings may indicate 
that the constantly battling Camorra groups impose an extremely heavy burden on 
Campania both in terms of violence and insecurity and in terms of criminal revenues. 
Camorra’s concentration in the region may explain the latter’s economic difficulties 
despite the availability of fertile land, an infrastructure endowment above the Italian 
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average, a large city like Naples, and several cultural and natural attractions. 
The case of the ‘Ndrangheta is different. This mafia obtains only 28% of its revenues 
from Calabria, which is a low-populated and relatively underdeveloped region. The 
‘Ndrangheta has a more composite structure, which has possibly favoured its expansion 
into other Italian regions and abroad.
58
 As shown in   
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Figure 9, Calabria furnishes only 28% of the ‘Ndrangheta’s proceeds. Northern 
Piedmont and Lombardy provide 20% and 14%, respectively. Emilia-Romagna and 
Lazio follow with 7% each. The ‘Ndrangheta’s diversified sources of income highlight 
its capacity to operate outside its original territory, since almost 50% of its revenues 
derive from four north-western regions (Lombardy, Piedmont, Emilia-Romagna and 
Liguria).  
Figure 8. Share of mafia proceeds from the region of origin, by type of mafia. Average 
estimates. 
 
Source: author’s elaboration  
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Figure 9. ‘Ndrangheta’s proceeds by region. Shares of the total and absolute values 
(€mn). Average estimates. 
Source: author’s elaboration  
Conclusions 
This study is a first attempt to estimate mafia proceeds in Italy. It estimates the total 
revenues by the mafia between €8.4 bn and €13 bn, numbers which are well below the 
most popular mythical numbers of €150 bn and €138 bn, widely publicized in the media 
and public opinion, but based on unclear or imprecise assumptions. Given the lack of 
previous reliable analyses, the findings reported here must be interpreted with caution. 
Their purpose is to stimulate public and academic debate on the actual size of mafia-
related criminal activities and their impact on the national and local economy.  
This study may also prompt further reflection by academics on the persistence of 
mythical numbers in criminology, particularly in the field of organized crime. These 
figures have probably also been successful because academics have either belittled 
estimates or uncritically exploited their sensationalist capacity. Given the shortage of 
reliable data, scholars have largely refrained from producing estimates. Sometimes, 
instead of questioning their reliability – with the risk of long technical debates and 
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damage to relations with stakeholders and funders – they have preferred to repeat these 
figures while citing their sources. As a result, mythical numbers on organized crime 
have gained power, and governments, international organizations, NGOs, and other 
stakeholders been provided with an effective opportunity to support their own agendas. 
Academics should reverse this attitude, since there is a need for more studies on the 
revenues of organized crime so that more precise estimations and improved policies can 
be produced on the phenomenon.  
In their essays on mythical numbers, both Singer and Reuter expressed 
pessimism about the possibility of solving the problem. They probably had good 
reasons for doing so. Indeed, when the results of the study conducted by Transcrime 
were disseminated, the media and other interested stakeholders were surprised at “how 
low” the estimates of mafia proceeds were. However after some discussion and 
clarification, it was generally recognized that previous estimates were unrealistic and 
unreliable (“mafias making more than 10% of Italian GDP, i.e. more than the car or 
tourism industries?!”). Furthermore, when the estimates were discussed with staff of 
international organizations actively involved in the development of policies against 
organised crime, an official whispered, “well, you could have produced higher 
figures…you know…”, suggesting that the estimates were not “high enough”.  
Despite the pessimism, there were also some encouraging signals. For example, 
a police official praised the study, particularly because “somebody has finally stopped 
talking about the ‘Ndrangheta’s monopoly of the cocaine market”. He then cited an 
analysis of serious drug cases investigated in the past two years in the area around 
Milan. The data showed than only a minority of the cases involved the ‘Ndrangheta, 
despite constant media attention in the same period. This exchange echoed Reuter’s 
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comments on the “demoralizing impact on lower level officials of having to work with 
numbers that they know are seriously in error”.59 
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